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GRAND JURY INNOVATION: TOWARD A FUNCTIONAL
MAKEOVER OF THE ANCIENT BULWARK OF LIBERTY
Roger A. Fairfax, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
The grand jury is a “much maligned” organ of the criminal justice system.1 
Regularly employed in only about half of the states and grudgingly tolerated in the
federal system,2 the American grand jury for two centuries has been criticized as
costly, ineffective, overly-compliant, and redundant. Prescriptions have ranged from
reforms designed to improve the grand jury’s performance of its traditional filtering
and charging functions to the outright abolition of the grand jury.3  Consequently,
much of the scholarly defense of the grand jury seemingly has done little more than
attempt to justify its very existence.
This Article seeks to take the grand jury on the offensive.  Instead of merely
proposing ways to enhance the grand jury’s performance of traditional roles, or de-
fending it against calls for its elimination, this Article sketches a blueprint for the
grand jury’s functional makeover.  Despite its tattered reputation, the American grand
jury boasts an impressive résumé, demonstrating capability far beyond the circum-
scribed functions it is deemed to perform so poorly today.  By illuminating the novel
and important functions the ancient “bulwark”4 of liberty might perform in the modern
* Associate Professor, George Washington University Law School. A.B., Harvard
College; M.A., University of London; J.D., Harvard Law School. Previous versions of this
Article were presented at the Criminal Law Research Collective at New York University Law
School, at Fordham University Law School, and at the Criminal Procedure Workshop at the
Southeastern Association of American Law Schools. The Article also benefited from conver-
sations with Laura Appleman, Rachel Barkow, Donald Braman, Katrice Copeland, Andrea
Dennis, Debby Denno, Lisa Fairfax, Kris Henning, Renee Hutchins, Sherri Lee Keene,
Margaret Lawton, Andy Leipold, Eric Miller, Michael Pinard, Steve Saltzburg, Kami Chavis
Simmons, and Ric Simmons. I am grateful to Samuel Gilbert, Adrienne Lawrence, Turia
Meah, Mai Pham, and Rebecca Rodgers for research assistance. This Article is dedicated to
the memory of James K. Robinson, Esq. (1943–2010).
1 See, e.g., Benjamin E. Rosenberg, A Proposed Addition to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure Requiring the Disclosure of the Prosecutor’s Legal Instructions to the
Grand Jury, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1443, 1462 (2001) (“The grand jury is much maligned . . . .”).
2 See 2 SARA SUN BEALE ET AL., GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 8:1–2 (2d ed. 2008).
3 See Phyllis L. Crocker, Appointed but (Nearly) Prevented From Serving: My Experiences
as a Grand Jury Foreperson, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 289, 300–02 (2004) (discussing scholarly
proposals to reform or abolish the grand jury).
4 United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 589 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring);
United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
339
340 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 19:339
criminal justice system, this Article paints a portrait of an efficacious and relevant
twenty-first century grand jury.
Part I of the Article considers the common historical and contemporary critiques
of the grand jury.  Although the legitimacy of some of these criticisms can be ques-
tioned, it must be conceded that there is significant room for improvement in the con-
temporary grand jury.  However, this Part argues that the traditional grand jury reform
proposals merely seek to enhance one or both of the grand jury’s dual non-investigatory
functions—the “adjudicatory” probable cause filtering function,5 and the “prosecu-
torial” discretionary function.6  Such proposed changes fall far short of the sort of
innovation that would augment the grand jury’s contribution to the maintenance and
improvement of the modern criminal justice system.
In Part II, the Article begins the shift from the common defensive posture—where
the focus is on how to repair the grand jury or justify its existence—to one where the
grand jury is employed beyond the narrow functional confines of its modern existence. 
Under the “Grand Jury 2.0” conception, the ancient body is utilized in novel ways to
meet the needs of the modern criminal justice system.  Part II responds to anticipated
objections to the use of the grand jury for purposes outside of its traditional adjudi-
catory and prosecutorial roles.  Chief among these are concerns about the capacity of
the grand jury to perform these novel roles, and potential common law, statutory, and
constitutional constraints on grand jury innovation.
Part III then proposes novel ways in which the grand jury might be utilized in
modern criminal justice.  This Part, for example, imagines the grand jury with a role
to play in plea bargaining—the means of disposition of over ninety percent of criminal
cases today.  In addition, this Part envisions the expansion of the grand jury’s func-
tional footprint to infuse criminal sentencing with popular input, to supervise corporate
deferred prosecution agreements, and as a tool of alternative dispute resolution with
grand jurors performing a facilitating role in the mediation of appropriate criminal
cases.  Other proposals would employ the grand jury as a vehicle for popular influence
in the ever-expanding drug court and problem-solving courts regime and cast the grand
jury as a community focus group, before which prosecutors might present a myriad
of questions relating to prosecutorial and enforcement priorities, criminal legislation,
and the law enforcement needs and preferences of the community.  The Article con-
cludes by going a step further and briefly exploring how the grand jury might be uti-
lized as an instrument for the enhancement of democratic deliberation and discourse
outside of the criminal justice system.
5 See Niki Kuckes, The Democratic Prosecutor: Explaining the Constitutional Function
of the Federal Grand Jury, 94 GEO. L.J. 1265, 1279–80 (2006) [hereinafter Kuckes, The
Democratic Prosecutor]; see also Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Grand Jury Discretion and
Constitutional Design, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 703, 720 (2008) [hereinafter Fairfax, Grand
Jury Discretion] (discussing the view that the grand jury was “designed to operate as a mere
probable cause filter”).
6 See Fairfax, Grand Jury Discretion, supra note 5, at 708 n.7; Kuckes, The Democratic
Prosecutor, supra note 5, at 1283–84.
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I. GRAND JURY 1.0
A. Classic Grand Jury Critiques
Why retain the grand jury?  Given the low esteem in which the grand jury is held
in American legal culture,7 it is surprising that we have not followed the lead of our
English forbearers and abolished the whole enterprise.8  Complaints about the grand
jury run the gamut from assertions that it imposes unnecessary costs on the system,
to the allegation that it is the complete captive of the prosecution.
1. Costliness
Critics since Jeremy Bentham have made the argument that the grand jury is far
too costly for whatever benefit it provides.9  During the debate in Congress over the
utility of the grand jury in the early twentieth century, some lawmakers insisted that
the costliness of maintaining the grand jury militated in favor of discarding it in the
vast majority of cases.10  Despite these concerns, there is scant evidence of significant
direct economic costs incurred as the result of retaining the grand jury.  Of course,
there needs to be physical space to house the grand jury, and the marginal cost of light-
ing and heating the grand jury room, often in the courthouse.  Perhaps the courthouse
budget must account for the price of refreshments for the grand jurors and per diem
payments to grand jurors.  Furthermore, there may be deputy marshals or other security
personnel specifically assigned to protecting the grand jurors and certain administrative
costs associated with the summoning and selection of grand jurors.  Even with these
various expenses, it is difficult to argue that the financial costs of the grand jury are
more than nominal at best.  However, even if the costs of the grand jury are not very
significant, critics might respond that no amount of cost is justified by a weak or inef-
fective filter.11  Ironically, some of the same grand jury critics inclined to bemoan the
manner in which the grand jury places unnecessary obstacles in the way of expedient
7 See, e.g., 1 BEALE ET AL., supra note 2, § 1:9.
8 See Crocker, supra note 3, at 300–02 (calling for the abolition of the grand jury); Roger
A. Fairfax, Jr., The Jurisdictional Heritage of the Grand Jury Clause, 91 MINN. L. REV. 398,
428 (2006) [hereinafter Fairfax, Jurisdictional Heritage] (recounting the abolition of the grand
jury in the United Kingdom).
9 See, e.g., 2 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 313 (London, Hunt
& Clarke 1827) (“[T]he institution is useless: it has been so about these two hundred and fifty
years.”); JEREMY BENTHAM, THE ELEMENTS OF THE ART OF PACKING, AS APPLIED TO SPECIAL
JURIES 26–28 (London, Effingham Wilson 1821).
10 See, e.g., 76 CONG. REC. 698–99 (1932); Fairfax, Jurisdictional Heritage, supra note
8, at 435 n.165.
11 See, e.g., Ovio C. Lewis, The Grand Jury: A Critical Evaluation, 13 AKRON L. REV
33, 66 (1979) (asserting that the grand jury is “a pawn in [the] technical game” of the criminal
justice system (quoting United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 512 (1943))).
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prosecution12 also complain, as is discussed below, that the grand jury is an overly-
compliant rubber stamp of the prosecutor, willing to indict on command.
2. Ineffectiveness (Over-Compliance)
Another common gripe against the grand jury is that it is an ineffective filter for
meritless criminal charges.13  Critics bemoan the fact that grand juries return a true bill
in over ninety percent of cases presented by prosecutors.14  A grand jury, the famous
saying goes, will “indict a ‘ham sandwich.’”15  However, there may have been probable
cause to believe the ham sandwich committed the crime.  Statistics show that in over
ninety-five percent of cases indicted by federal grand juries, a conviction follows.16 
12 Perhaps there are efficiency “costs” to the system in forcing prosecutors to take the time
to seek an indictment instead of proceeding directly to trial on an information. Of course,
defendants who plead guilty (the method by which nearly all federal criminal cases are dis-
posed of) may waive grand jury indictment. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(b); U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N, FINAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT 42 (2009). Such was not always the case; as
recently as sixty years ago, it was still assumed that a defendant could plead guilty to a felony
offense only after grand jury indictment. See Fairfax, Jurisdictional Heritage, supra note 8,
at 448–49.
Forgoing grand jury indictment in criminal cases certainly may be more efficient and less
exhaustive of limited prosecutorial resources, but so would the withdrawal of many criminal
procedural rights.
13 See, e.g., William J. Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
174, 174 (1973) (“[T]he grand jury is the total captive of the prosecutor who . . . can indict
anybody, at any time, for almost anything . . . .”); Niki Kuckes, The Useful, Dangerous
Fiction of Grand Jury Independence, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 2 (2004) [hereinafter Kuckes,
Dangerous Fiction] (“Most knowledgeable observers would describe the federal grand jury . . .
as a handmaiden of the prosecutor . . . .”); Gerald B. Lefcourt, High Time For a Bill of Rights
for the Grand Jury, THE CHAMPION, Apr. 1998, at 5 (quoting a former federal judge as stating,
“The grand jury is the total captive of the prosecutor, who, if he is candid, will concede that
he can indict anybody, at any time, for almost anything before any grand jury.”).
14 See Ric Simmons, Re-Examining the Grand Jury: Is There Room for Democracy in the
Criminal Justice System?, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1, 31–32 (2004) (citing a 1984 report showing a
99.6% indictment rate for federal grand juries nationwide and a 1999 report showing a 94.1%
indictment rate for New York state).
15 United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184, 1195 (9th Cir. 2005) (recounting
former New York State Chief Judge Sol Wachtler’s statement that “a Grand Jury would indict
a ‘ham sandwich’” (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena of Stewart, 545 N.Y.S. 2d 974, 977
n.1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989))).
16 Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct in Grand Jury Investigations, 51 S.C. L.
REV. 1, 5 & n.24 (1999); Kevin K. Washburn, Restoring the Grand Jury, 76 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2333, 2370 & n.179 (2008). This figure includes both convictions at trial and convic-
tions resulting from guilty pleas. A fair argument might be made, however, that the fact of
grand jury indictment exerts pressure upon a defendant, making it more likely that he will plead
guilty to meritless charges. See Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
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If a petit jury convicts on (or a judge overseeing a guilty plea is convinced that there
exists) proof beyond a reasonable doubt, why should it be troubling that a grand jury
found probable cause?17  Indeed, that petit juries overwhelmingly confirm grand juries’
earlier probable cause determinations should not be surprising.18  First, because of
stigma associated with the failure to obtain a true bill from a grand jury, many prose-
cutors work hard to ensure that the case has more than enough evidence to satisfy the
probable cause standard employed by grand juries.19  In fact, federal prosecutors are
instructed not to pursue criminal charges until they have obtained or believe they will
obtain proof sufficient to survive a motion for judgment of acquittal at trial (proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt), a much more exacting standard than that required for grand
jury indictment.20
1117, 1132–35 (2008) (discussing where it may be advantageous for an innocent defendant
to plead guilty).
17 Of course, the petit jury certainly is not foolproof, and innocent defendants can be con-
victed even under the higher standard of proof. However, to the extent that false convictions
after jury trials are a regular occurrence, the blame should be spread far beyond the grand jury.
See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and
Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1 (2009) (discussing how invalid forensic testimony can
lead to wrongful convictions); Andrew D. Leipold, How the Pretrial Process Contributes to
Wrongful Convictions, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1123 (2005) (suggesting that the pretrial process
can distort the gathering and presentation of exculpatory evidence, thereby contributing to
wrongful convictions); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful
Convictions: A Thought Experiment in the Regulation of Prosecutors, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1
(2009) (identifying prosecutorial negligence as a source of wrongful conviction).
18 Of course, the vast majority of charged criminal cases are disposed of by guilty plea,
not trial. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in
a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1150 (2001) [hereinafter Bibas, Judicial Fact-
Finding] (“Our world is no longer one of trials, but of guilty pleas.”); Ronald F. Wright, Trial
Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 90
(2005) (reporting that, in 2002, 95.2% of federal defendants plead guilty). However, even in
the post-indictment guilty plea context, the presiding judge must satisfy herself that the govern-
ment possesses sufficient admissible evidence to establish a factual basis for the plea. FED. R.
CRIM. P. 11(b)(3); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465 (1969). Therefore, the grand
jury’s probable cause determination is affirmed in this context as well. For the suggestion of
an innovative role the grand jury can play in the guilty plea process, see infra Part III.A.
19 See Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d at 1195 n.16 (citing Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand
Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 260, 273–78 (1995)).
20 See, e.g., UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-27.220 (2002); see also ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION,
3–3.9 (3d ed. 1993) (“A prosecutor should not institute, cause to be instituted, or permit the
continued pendency of criminal charges in the absence of sufficient admissible evidence to
support a conviction.”). Of course, whenever there is an acquittal at trial on the merits or suf-
ficiency of the evidence, we rightly should question why the grand jury did not filter out the
charges earlier. However, as has been noted, the grand jury is not determining proof beyond
a reasonable doubt; it is merely screening the government’s allegations for probable cause.
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, because the grand jury process is fluid, prosecutors often have
the opportunity to poll grand jurors regarding weaknesses in the case.21  Given that
a prosecutor can take another “bite at the apple”22 with regard to evidence presentation
before the grand jury votes whether to indict, cases before the grand jury are strength-
ened and surprises at the voting stage can be kept to a minimum.23  Despite the com-
mon lore regarding the grand jury, even the grand jury’s harshest critics must concede
that, in the broad run of cases, weak or meritless charges largely are screened out by
the grand jury.24
3. Redundancy
Cast as an antiquated filter for meritless criminal allegations in a modern criminal
justice system replete with professional prosecutors, vigilant judges, near-universal
criminal defense representation, and a watchful media, the grand jury is often char-
acterized as redundant.25  When the grand jury operated in the nineteenth century,
there were virtually no public prosecutors.26  Victims—either represented by counsel
or otherwise—were able to bring their own allegations to trial, subject to the approval
of the grand jury.27  As a result, the grand jury was tasked with making decisions
whether and what to charge.28  Therefore, the grand jury helped to protect against abuse
of the criminal process by private citizens seeking revenge or concession through the
filing of criminal charges.29  Furthermore, the lack of a public police force meant that
21 See Leipold, supra note 19, at 266 (“[G]rand jurors may . . . discuss the case with the
prosecutor as evidence is submitted.”).
22 Simmons, supra note 14, at 19 (citation omitted).
23 Granted, if the grand jury were to fulfill its intended role as a “democratic prosecutor,”
the proportion of indictments rejected by grand juries may very well grow. See Kuckes, The
Democratic Prosecutor, supra note 5, passim; see also Fairfax, Grand Jury Discretion, supra
note 5, passim (arguing that the grand jury may have a discretionary role to play in enhancing
criminal justice).
24 See, e.g., Scott E. Sundby, Mapp v. Ohio’s Unsung Hero: The Suppression Hearing
as Morality Play, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 255, 268 n.39 (2010). There is also, as one scholar
has noted, the possibility of the underreporting of grand jury rejections of proposed indictments.
Simmons, supra note 14, at 32–34.
25 Fairfax, Jurisdictional Heritage, supra note 8, at 429 (discussing a study that criticized
the grand jury as “redundant in a system that also had provision for preliminary examination,
and claimed that ‘[i]t is no longer needed as a bulwark of our liberties’” (citation omitted));
Kuckes, Dangerous Fiction, supra note 13, at 2–4 (noting that prosecutorial decisions are
implemented consistently without challenge).
26 See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Delegation of the Criminal Prosecution Function to Private
Actors, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 411, 422–23 & n.33 (2009) [hereinafter Fairfax, Delegation].
27 See Harold J. Krent, Executive Control over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons
from History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 292–93 (1989) (noting that citizens presented evidence
of crimes directly to the grand jury).
28 See id. at 292–93 & n.81.
29 See ALLEN STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PHILADELPHIA,
1800–1880, at 64 (1989).
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the grand jury played a substantial role in identifying individuals for criminal accusa-
tion.30  Also, the lack of right to counsel in that era meant that the grand jury was the
only protection many putative criminal defendants were likely to enjoy.31
In the modern criminal justice system, these functions are performed by public
prosecutors, public police, and court-appointed defense attorneys.  Moreover, in the
absence of a grand jury, a judicial officer often will pass upon the accusations to en-
sure that they are supported by probable cause.32  Thus, the argument goes, there is
no longer a need for the grand jury to perform these various roles played by modern
institutional players.
However, such critiques fail to recognize that not all probable cause determi-
nations are created equal.  In the same way that a magistrate’s probable cause deter-
mination is given more weight and deference than a police officer’s, so too does a
grand jury’s probable cause determination enjoy greater respect.33  The reason for this
is that the grand jury is not a governmental entity, but the community’s representative.34 
As such, it serves as a check on government officials (a judge and a prosecutor) who
conceivably could collaborate to bring meritless charges against a defendant.  The
grand jury’s added value rebuts the charge of redundancy critics often advance.
B. Grand Jury 1.0 (Service Pack 1): Traditional Grand Jury Reform Proposals
Even though the grand jury may be defended against some of the most common
critiques lodged against it, the fact remains that the institution is perceived to have
fallen far short of the aspirations the Framers may have had when they included it in the
Bill of Rights.35  Sporting a proud heritage of serving as a shield between the colonial,
30 Fairfax, Delegation, supra note 26, at 422–23 & n.33.
31 Cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (articulating the right to counsel in
state prosecutions for the first time); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (articulating the
right to counsel in federal prosecutions); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 298 (1930)
(holding that the constitutional right to a jury trial can be waived in a criminal case); United
States v. Gill, 55 F.2d 399, 403 (D.N.M. 1932) (holding under Patton’s logic that a defendant
may waive the Fifth Amendment right to indictment in “capital and other infamous cases”).
32 See, e.g., Kuckes, Dangerous Fiction, supra note 13, at 59 (citation omitted).
33 For example, when a detained federal defendant is arrested by a law enforcement officer
who has found probable cause, the government must still obtain a complaint supported by
probable cause found by a magistrate judge. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(b). Even after that judicial
determination, a defendant is entitled to a preliminary hearing, which is an adversarial probable
cause hearing before a judicial officer within a set time-frame. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(c).
If, however, the grand jury returns an indictment against the defendant before the required
preliminary hearing takes place, the later judicial finding of probable cause is obviated. See
FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(a)(2).
34 See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
35 See, e.g., Leipold, supra note 19, at 323 (“[A]lthough the framers of the Bill of Rights
considered grand juries an important protector of individual liberty, time and close scrutiny
has shown that they are not.”).
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state, and federal powers and the individual subject and citizen, the grand jury was held
in tremendous esteem by those in the Founding generation.36  Furthermore, the grand
jury was a center of civic life and interaction, playing a role in local governance and
serving as a mechanism for the exchange and dissemination of ideas on government.37
Those in the Founding generation very well might be shocked at the extent to
which the grand jury has become a largely invisible and little respected part of the
American government and criminal justice.  The Supreme Court’s late-nineteenth
century determination, in Hurtado v. California,38 that grand jury indictment was not
essential to due process in the initiation of state criminal proceedings39 revealed the
early slippage in the respect accorded the grand jury institution.  Perhaps it was this
environment which permitted the English movement toward abolition of the grand jury
to be entertained seriously in the United States in the early part of the twentieth cen-
tury.40  Although those abolition efforts fell short of their goal, and the federal grand
jury right was left intact, calls for reform of the grand jury nevertheless remained.
Despite the shortcomings of the most common critiques of the grand jury, there
is ample room for improvement.  Although criticism of the American grand jury was
voiced throughout the twentieth century,41 the grand jury’s perceived shortcomings
were thrust onto the main stage of American politics during the investigations into the
Watergate break-ins.42  As a result of apparent failings of the grand jury during this
episode, a number of legislative efforts were undertaken to “reform” the grand jury.43
In 1976, the 94th Congress considered eight bills and one House resolution on
the issue of grand jury reform.44  One such bill contained many of the leading reform
36 See Fairfax, Jurisdictional Heritage, supra note 8, at 408–12.
37 See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 221–23 (1999) (explaining
that grand juries had multiple civic functions such as governing localities, investigating the
physical conditions of roads, bridges, and ferries, supervising the prices of commodities, and
fixing the rates of taxes); Simmons, supra note 14, at 4–5 & n.8 (noting that the grand jury
was a political body that served many functions).
38 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
39 Id. at 538.
40 See Fairfax, Jurisdictional Heritage, supra note 8, at 428–30 (noting that sharp criticism
of the grand jury began in the nineteenth century and continued into the twentieth century).
41 Id.
42 See, e.g., KEN GORMLEY, ARCHIBALD COX: CONSCIENCE OF A NATION 293 (1997) (“A
group of ordinary men and women [the grand jury] . . . had quietly made one of the most im-
portant decisions in the constitutional history of the nation [to subpoena the President of the
United States].”); Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking the Identity and Role of United States Attorneys,
6 OHIO. ST. J. CRIM. L. 369, 419 n.272 (2009) (citing John W. Dean III, Watergate: What
Was It?, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 609, 611–12 & n.6 (2000)).
43 Federal Grand Jury: Hearing on H.J. Res. 46, H.R. 1277 and Related Bills, Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, and Int’l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th
Cong. 2–3 (1976).
44 Reform of the Grand Jury System: Hearing on S. 3274, H.R. 1277, H.R. 6006, H.R.
6207, H.R. 10947, H.R. 11660, H.R. 11870, H.R. 14146, and H.J. Res. 46 Before the Subcomm.
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proposals, including: (1) a reduction of the time limit on civil contempt confinement
for witnesses found in contempt of a grand jury subpoena from eighteen months to six
months; (2) a requirement that grand jurors be informed during empanelment by the
district judge about their independent powers of investigation; (3) empowering the
grand jury to retain a “special attorney” who could sign indictments when a prosecutor
refused; (4) the right of defense counsel to be present in the grand jury room; and (5) a
requirement that the government present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury prior
to indictment.45  The reform package failed to gain traction.46
The 95th Congress picked up the issue after President-Elect Carter’s nominee for
Attorney General, Griffin Bell, stated during his confirmation hearing that he would
be open-minded regarding grand jury reform.47  The package of reform proposals, now
styled The Grand Jury Reform Act of 1978,48 garnered additional support, both within
Congress, and from the powerful American Bar Association (ABA).49  Hearings before
the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Administrative Practice and Procedure Subcommittee
were significantly more balanced, if a bit contentious.50  In the end, however, the leg-
islative efforts stalled.51
In 1985, the 99th Congress sought to revive grand jury reform shortly after Presi-
dent Reagan’s landslide re-election.52  The witness list was again fairly balanced,53 but
the Department of Justice dug in its heels, even proposing changes to the grand jury
secrecy rules that were seen by many to cut against the spirit of the reform proposals.54 
on Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. (1976) [hereinafter
Senate Grand Jury Reform Hearing 1976].
45 See S. 3274, 94th Cong. §§ 2, 4 (1976).
46 In September 1976, the Senate Judiciary Committee heard testimony on the legislation.
See Senate Grand Jury Reform Hearing 1976, supra note 44. The witness list weighed
heavily against grand jury reform and the Department of Justice opposed almost all of the
proposals. See id. In a Presidential election year, reform efforts (unsurprisingly) fizzled out.
See Gregory T. Fouts, Note, Reading the Jurors Their Rights: The Continuing Question of
Grand Jury Independence, 79 IND. L.J. 323, 340 (2004) (discussing the reform package).
47 The Prospective Nomination of Griffin B. Bell, of Georgia, to be Attorney General:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 83 (1977) (statement of Griffin
B. Bell, nominee to be Att’y Gen. of the United States).
48 S. 3405, 95th Cong. (1978).
49 See Laurie O. Robinson, Introduction to AM. BAR ASS’N, GRAND JURY POLICY AND
MODEL ACT 2–3 (Marcia Christensen ed., 1982) [hereinafter ABA GRAND JURY POLICY].
50 See Grand Jury Reform Act of 1978: Hearing on S. 3405 Before the Subcomm. on
Admin. Practice and Procedure of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. (1979).
51 See Leipold, supra note 19, at 272 (noting that numerous proposals to alter the grand
jury system were considered, but most were rejected).
52 See Grand Jury Reform Act of 1985: Hearings on H.R. 1407 and Related Bills Before
the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. (1987).
53 See id. at iii–iv.
54 The Department asked Congress to amend Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)
to remove obstacles to the sharing of grand jury materials between criminal prosecutors and
government civil attorneys. See id. at 244.
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Once again, the Hill failed to pass grand jury reform legislation.55  If the decade after
Watergate exposed perceived flaws with the role and function of the grand jury, little,
if any, progress was made toward addressing the problems.
The Independent Counsel Statute,56 a product of the Watergate era, would renew
fervor for grand jury reform at the end of the twentieth century.  The investigation into
perjury allegations against President William Jefferson Clinton produced a great deal
of interest in—and criticism of—the grand jury.57  The Independent Counsel’s grand
jury investigation of criminal allegations against a sitting President of the United
States—an episode during which the President himself, and members of the White
House staff, testified before the grand jury—once again propelled the ancient grand
jury institution into the public consciousness.58
A number of private and bar entities became active in pressing for grand jury
reform.  The ABA, which had long played a role in advocating grand jury reform, con-
tinued to advocate the ABA Grand Jury Principles, a collection of thirty recommen-
dations for grand jury reform.59  Among the proposed reforms were the right to counsel
in the grand jury room, the prosecutorial duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to the
grand jury, and the grand jury target’s right to testify in the grand jury.60
The ABA was joined by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
(NACDL).61  The NACDL published, in 2000, a “Grand Jury Bill of Rights,”62 which
set out ten specific reforms for the grand jury, representing many of the more widely-
supported proposals produced during the legislative skirmishes of the 1970s and 1980s. 
Among the NACDL proposals were: (1) presence of counsel for grand jury witness
inside of the grand jury room;63 (2) disclosure of exculpatory evidence to the grand
55 Kathryn E. White, Comment, What Have You Done with My Lawyer: The Grand Jury
Witness’s Right to Consult with Counsel, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 907, 920 (1999).
56 28 U.S.C. §§ 591–98 (2006).
57 See Lefcourt, supra note 13, at 5.
58 See, e.g., KEN GORMLEY, THE DEATH OF AMERICAN VIRTUE: CLINTON VS. STARR
538–52 (2010).
59 See ABA GRAND JURY POLICY, supra note 49, at 4–5.
60 See id. at 4.
61 See Lefcourt, supra note 13, at 5. During this same time-frame, the Washington, D.C.-
based Council for Court Excellence also published a study of the federal and local District
of Columbia grand jury system. COUNCIL FOR COURT EXCELLENCE, THE GRAND JURY OF
TOMORROW: NEW LIFE FOR AN ARCHAIC INSTITUTION (2001). The report contained a number
of proposed reforms, including many which overlap with the NACDL proposals. See id.;
Michael Waldman, Grand Jury: Ripe for Reform, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2002, at 5.
62 See NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, FEDERAL GRAND JURY REFORM
REPORT & “BILL OF RIGHTS” (2000) [hereinafter NACDL, GRAND JURY REPORT & BILL OF
RIGHTS]. The NACDL committee charged with developing and advancing these proposals
boasted a number of prominent attorneys, including Elkan Abramowitz, Barbara Bergman,
John W. Keker, Gerald B. Lefcourt, Herbert J. Miller, Jr., Neal R. Sonnett, Brendan Sullivan,
Larry D. Thompson, Anton R. Valukas, and Theodore V. Wells, Jr. Id.
63 Id. at 10.
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jury;64 (3) prohibition of presentation of evidence to the grand jury the prosecutor
knows (because of a court ruling) to be constitutionally inadmissible at trial;65 (4) right
of a grand jury target or subject to testify before the grand jury;66 (5) right of a grand
jury witness to receive a transcript of their testimony;67 (6) prohibition on naming in an
indictment an unindicted co-conspirator;68 (7) Miranda warnings for all non-immunized
subjects or targets called to testify before a grand jury;69 (8) 72 hours notice before date
of appearance pursuant to a grand jury subpoena;70 (9) meaningful legal instructions
given to the grand juror on the record, and made available to the accused following
indictment;71 and (10) prohibition on calling a witness to testify when the prosecutor
knows the witness intends to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination.72
However, two grand jury reform bills taken up by the Senate in the midst of the
impeachment of President Clinton went nowhere.73  Despite hearings in the House
Judiciary Committee in 2000,74 the Department of Justice was able to ward off any
further legislative efforts toward grand jury reform.75  Although some proposed grand
jury reforms have found support at the state level,76 and in court decisions at the fed-
eral level,77 comprehensive grand jury reform has proved elusive.
In any event, many of the suggestions for improving the grand jury have been
directed toward making it a better probable cause filter.78  In other words, the focus
64 Id. at 10–11.
65 Id. at 11.
66 Id. at 12.
67 Id. at 12–13.
68 Id. at 13–14.
69 Id. at 14.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 14–15.
72 Id. at 15.
73 Grand Jury Reform Act of 1998, S. 2289, 105th Cong. (1998); Grand Jury Due Process
Act, S. 2030, 105th Cong. (1998).
74 Constitutional Rights and the Grand Jury: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000). The witnesses for the
hearing included Professor Sara Sun Beale, Professor Peter J. Henning, Professor Andrew
D. Leipold, Loretta E. Lynch (United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York),
and James K. Robinson (Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division of the United
States Department of Justice). Id. at iii.
75 See id. at 4 (statement of James K. Robinson, Assistant Att’y Gen.); see also Raju
Chebium, Government Urges Congress to Leave Grand Jury System Alone, CNN (July 27,
2000), http://articles.cnn.com/2000-07-27/justice/grand.jury_1_grand-jury-witnesses-criminal
-justice?_s=PM:LAW.
76 See, e.g., John F. Decker, Legislating New Federalism: The Call for Grand Jury Reform
in the States, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 341, 343 (2005); Lefcourt, supra note 13, at 34 (noting
various grand jury reforms adopted in New York State).
77 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury, 490 F.3d 978, 990 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that grand jury
witnesses were entitled to transcripts of their grand jury testimony).
78 See NACDL, GRAND JURY REPORT & BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 62, at 5 (“The great
benefit from the proposed reforms . . . would be that flaws in potential charges might be
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of grand jury reform has been to enhance the grand jury’s performance of its judicial
function—that is, determining whether the prosecutor has met the probable cause
threshold.79  Although such reforms are important, they may reflect too narrow a view
of the grand jury’s importance and potential.  Recently, scholars have argued that the
grand jury has a prosecutorial role to play as well.80  Under this view, the grand jury
in effect “partners” with the prosecutor to determine not only whether there is probable
cause to believe an individual committed a crime, but also whether that individual
should be prosecuted.81
Within our criminal justice system, various actors constantly make discretionary
calls as to which lawbreakers will be prosecuted and punished.  The “prosecutorial”
view simply perceives the grand jury as having the same capacity and authority to
exercise discretion as does a law enforcement officer or a prosecutor.82  The grand
jury’s exercises of discretion are acceptable for a number of reasons, including the
fact that they are an articulation of community sentiment,83 and yet their decisions are
not made final and irreversible by operation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.84  Various
grand jury reform proposals, including enhanced instructions to the grand jury regard-
ing its role,85 would bolster the grand jury in this discretionary role.
However, taking the prosecutorial view does not necessarily help change the
perception of the grand jury as an artifact of the criminal justice system.  First, grand
juries have performed this prosecutorial function throughout United States history.86 
Also, the notion that the grand jury should perform such a role does not counter claims
that the grand jury is redundant.  Of course, government attorneys perform the prose-
cutorial role.  Indeed, the very development of the office of the modern public prose-
cutor was premised in part on the belief that a publicly-funded, professional prosecutor
served the ends of justice and efficiency in a way that a private model (with only the
grand jury as an arbiter of what would be prosecuted) could not.87
exposed at the grand jury stage, and unwarranted prosecutions would be less likely to be
brought.”).
79 See supra Fairfax, Grand Jury Discretion, supra note 6, at 720; Kuckes, The
Democratic Prosecutor, supra note 6, at 1279-80.
80 See Fairfax, Grand Jury Discretion, supra note 5, passim; Kuckes, The Democratic
Prosecutor, supra note 5, passim.
81 See Kuckes, The Democratic Prosecutor, supra note 5, at 1283–85 (noting the grand
jury’s role is akin to the charging decision made by a prosecutor).
82 See id. at 1283–84.
83 See Fairfax, Grand Jury Discretion, supra note 5, at 760 (“[T]he grand jury, sitting as
a body of the accused’s peers and representing the voice of the community, is uniquely posi-
tioned to exercise such discretion.”).
84 See id. at 743.
85 See, e.g., NACDL, GRAND JURY REPORT & BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 62, at 14–15
(listing the grand jury’s right to meaningful instructions regarding their duties among the
“Grand Jury Bill of Rights”); see also Fairfax, Grand Jury Discretion, supra note 5, at 761.
86 Fairfax, Grand Jury Discretion, supra note 5, at 729–31; Fairfax, Jurisdictional Heritage,
supra note 8, at 408–12.
87 See Fairfax, Delegation, supra note 26, at 435 (“[T]he public prosecution norm has
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In the end, neither of the two central aims of traditional grand jury reform pro-
posals—bolstering the grand jury in its judicial role and enhancing the grand jury’s
prosecutorial role—fully ushers in the sort of innovation that would bring the grand
jury in line with the needs of modern criminal justice.  Part II argues that the grand
jury possesses the malleability and potential to serve that role.
II. THE CASE FOR GRAND JURY INNOVATION
Many of the aforementioned reforms would help the grand jury perform both its
filtering and discretionary roles in a much more effective way.  However, these pro-
posed reforms merely fortify the grand jury in its existing, traditional “judicial” and
“prosecutorial” roles.  They do not help to make the case that the grand jury is a useful,
vital component of the criminal justice system.  This Part makes the case that not only
can the grand jury serve such a role, but that it should be utilized in such a manner.
A. The Grand Jury’s Susceptibility to Innovation
It is not obvious the grand jury can be pressed into service for functions beyond
the traditional judicial and prosecutorial roles it plays today.  Given the grand jury’s
long history stretching back to the twelfth century,88 there may be a question whether
the grand jury is subject to the sort of innovation proposed in this Article.  The grand
jury is essentially a “creature of the common law,”89 with little, if any, guidance as to
its core attributes in the Constitution.  The grand jury existed in colonial America be-
fore the framing of the Constitution.90  Although the right to federal grand jury indict-
ment was not established until the Fifth Amendment was ratified, the grand jury was
utilized in the former colonies from before the Articles of Confederation until the Bill
of Rights.91  Indeed, the original Constitution contemplated grand jury indictment,92
and many early state constitutions included a grand jury provision.93  But for all of its
become closely associated with the legitimate exercise of government power, public confi-
dence in the criminal justice system, and the proper pursuit of justice.”).
88 Fairfax, Jurisdictional Heritage, supra note 8, at 408–09 & n.39.
89 Fairfax, Grand Jury Discretion, supra note 5, at 726.
90 Fairfax, Jurisdictional Heritage, supra note 8, at 409–10.
91 Id. at 410–11.
92 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
93 See, e.g., ALA. CONST. of 1865, art. I, § 9; ARK. CONST. of 1874, art. II, § 8; CAL.
CONST. of 1849, art. I, § 8; COLO. CONST. of 1876, art. II, § 23; CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. I,
§ 9; DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. VI, § 15; FLA. CONST. of 1865, art. I, § 16; GA. CONST. of
1777, art. XLV; ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. XIII, § 10; IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. I, § 11; KAN.
CONST. of 1855, art. I, § 10; ME. CONST. of 1820, art. I, § 7; MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. I,
§ 11; MINN. CONST. of 1857, art. I, § 7; N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. I, § 9; N.Y. CONST. of
1846, art. I, § 6; R.I. CONST. of 1847, art. I, § 7. These historical constitutions are reprinted
in BEN PERLEY POORE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS,
AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (Lawbook Exch. 2d. ed. 2001) (1887).
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heritage and constitutional stature, the grand jury is a “preconstitutional institution”94
with few defining characteristics.
As the grand jury has evolved over its six or seven centuries, perhaps the only
structural consistency to be found throughout this history is the (somewhat aspirational)
notion that the body is meant to represent community sentiment with regard to the
object of the inquiry, whether determining the presence of probable cause or making
charging decisions.95  Regardless of the rules governing its composition or its busi-
ness, the grand jury always has been considered the “voice of the community.”96  How-
ever, much of what we consider to be standard grand jury purpose and practice is as
malleable as the legislative will to update it to modern needs.
Indeed, the contours of the modern grand jury are defined largely by statute and
court rule.  For example, the requirement of federal grand jury secrecy is enforced
through Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.97  Likewise, the fre-
quency of grand jury meetings, the length of term, and the number and selection of
grand jurors are all defined by statute.98  In many instances, these statutes do imple-
ment common law, but there is nothing to prevent the legislature from departing from
the grand jury’s customary or historical function.  That said, it likely would be improper
for a statute or court rule to completely undermine the essential function performed
by the grand jury at the time the Framers included it in the Bill of Rights.99  If we are
to give any meaning to the Grand Jury Clause, then the grand jury must retain some
semblance of its central role of representing community sentiment in initiating criminal
prosecutions in serious criminal cases.  However, there is nothing that would prohibit
the use of the grand jury for purposes beyond this core function.
94 United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1312 (9th Cir. 1977) (describing the grand jury
as a “preconstitutional institution”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977).
95 See, e.g., Fairfax, Grand Jury Discretion, supra note 5, at 711–12; Kuckes, The
Democratic Prosecutor, supra note 5, at 1300 (citing Judge Learned Hand’s opinion in In
re Kittle, 180 F. 946, 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1910)).
96 Susan W. Brenner, The Voice of the Community: A Case for Grand Jury Independence,
3 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 67, 67 (1995). Of course, given the many discriminatory restrictions
on grand jury service throughout American history, the grand jury was arguably never truly
was the “voice of the community.” See, e.g., Hale v. Crawford, 65 F.2d 739, 747 (1st Cir.
1933) (upholding grand jury exclusion based on race), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 674 (1933);
PATRICIA SULLIVAN, LIFT EVERY VOICE: THE NAACP AND THE MAKING OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 165–68 (2009).
97 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).
98 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3321–34 (2006). In Michigan, for instance, a “one-man grand jury”
is employed in certain circumstances. George H. Dession, From Indictment to Information—
Implications of the Shift, 42 YALE L.J. 163, 191–92 (1932); Thaddeus Hoffmeister, The Grand
Jury Legal Advisor: Resurrecting the Grand Jury’s Shield, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1171, 1217 & n.323 (2008).
99 See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases:
Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1433, 1498 n.388 (1984).
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B. The Grand Jury as an Appropriate Vehicle for Criminal Justice Innovation
Even if the grand jury can be remade, however, why not create or remake a
different entity to perform the roles proposed for the “new” grand jury?  Congress
or state legislatures easily can create an entity with the subpoena and investigative
power for which the grand jury is celebrated, not to mention the new functions con-
templated for “Grand Jury 2.0” in this Article.  Although this is undoubtedly true, the
grand jury is a superior vehicle for delivering the sort of innovation contemplated
in this Article.
First, the grand jury’s historical prestige makes it an ideal vehicle for bringing
needed reform to the criminal justice system.  Bolstered by centuries of history,100 the
grand jury has a proven track record of operating at the center of the criminal process. 
In addition, as the result of its long tenure, the grand jury brings credibility to the
tasks to which it might be assigned.  A brand new, unproven entity is unlikely to
have the clout that the grand jury, despite all of its criticism, carries.
Furthermore, certain structural characteristics of the grand jury make it particu-
larly well-suited to perform certain new tasks.  The size of the grand jury (typically
twenty-three) helps it to represent a cross-section of the community and its diversity
of background and experience.101  Also, the fact that the grand jury traditionally sits
for relatively lengthy periods allows time for the absorption and exposure necessary
to make informed contributions to the administration of criminal justice in many dif-
ferent respects.102
Also, the performance of innovative tasks may enhance the already significant
benefits that grand jurors can derive from grand jury service.  Alexis de Tocqueville
famously described the jury as a “free school.”103  The grand jury, because of its size
and exposure to multiple matters, provides even more of a civic education than does
service on the petit jury.  If the grand jury, in its traditional roles, can provide citizens
an education,104 the grand jury performing the innovative roles contemplated below
can provide a veritable Ph.D. in civic engagement.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the grand jury has demonstrated its tremen-
dous potential to contribute beyond the traditional roles assigned to it today.  Even
within the American experience, the grand jury has served as a pivotal institution in
100 Fairfax, Jurisdictional Heritage, supra note 8, at 408–09.
101 See Fairfax, Grand Jury Discretion, supra note 5, at 745.
102 Id.
103 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 316 (Arthur Goldhammer trans.,
Library of America 2004) (1835) (“[The grand jury] should be seen as a free school, and one
that is always open . . . .”).
104 Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Harmless Constitutional Error and the Institutional Significance
of the Jury, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2027, 2054–55 (2008) (“[T]he American jury serves as a
vehicle for the education of the citizenry . . . .”); see also JOHN GASTIL ET AL., THE JURY AND
DEMOCRACY: HOW JURY DELIBERATION PROMOTES CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND POLITICAL
PARTICIPATION (2010).
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the civic life of communities.105  For example, grand juries in colonial America levied
taxes, allocated public works spending, appointed government officials, and helped
to manage other affairs of local government.106  Only later did the grand jury begin
to be limited to the circumscribed roles it performs today.107  Nevertheless, the grand
jury carries in its DNA the ability to leverage its attributes and add value beyond the
traditional judicial and prosecutorial roles.
Once we are convinced that the grand jury might have some utility beyond its
traditional functions, and we agree that the grand jury can be altered consistent with
constitutional and common law constraints, the question remains—how would we use
it?  The next Part advances an agenda of grand jury innovation.
III. GRAND JURY 2.0: GRAND JURY AS A TOOL TO FACILITATE CUTTING-EDGE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
So, where would grand jury innovation take us?  For what other purposes could
we utilize this potentially dynamic body?  This Part envisions the grand jury as a tool
for injecting popular input into plea bargaining and sentencing, for implementing suc-
cessful strategies employing cutting-edge alternative dispute resolution and diver-
sion mechanisms in criminal justice, and as an instrument for guiding, regulating, and
supporting prosecutors in the important work they do.
The purpose of cataloguing these innovative potential uses for the grand jury is
not to establish the merits for their adoption—although some of them might be con-
sidered wise criminal justice policy.  Rather, the acknowledgment of these potential
new uses for the grand jury is crucial to altering the common perception of the grand
jury as an artifact of a bygone era.  In other words, this Article seeks to begin the re-
conceptualization of the grand jury as a mechanism for serving the needs of modern
criminal justice.
A. Plea Bargaining and Sentencing
1. Plea Bargaining
The guilty plea, not trial, is the primary mechanism for disposition of criminal
cases in modern American criminal justice.108  Recently, many commentators have
105 See LEVY, supra note 37, at 221–23 (citing specific examples of the grand jury’s civic
role in history); Fairfax, Jurisdictional Heritage, supra note 8, at 410 n.45 (“[C]olonial grand
juries often addressed matters of local concern . . . .”).
106 Id.; see, e.g., Mark Kadish, Behind the Locked Door of an American Grand Jury: Its
History, Its Secrecy, and Its Process, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (1996) (noting several
examples of grand juries in local affairs); Simmons, supra note 14, at 10–11 (“[G]rand juries
filled a void created by the scarcity of local representative government.”).
107 See Brenner, supra note 96, at 71–72; Fouts, supra note 46, at 329.
108 See supra note 18.
2010] GRAND JURY INNOVATION 355
explored guilty pleas and plea bargaining from formerly unexamined angles and con-
texts.109  Given that very few charged cases actually go to trial, the shifting scholarly
focus from trial procedure to guilty plea procedure is understandable.110  However, this
renewed scholarly interest in guilty pleas has not yet accounted fully for the grand
jury.  Although prosecutors and judges necessarily overshadow and displace petit
juries in the “world of guilty pleas,”111 this does not mean the grand jury has no role
to play in a modern criminal justice system dominated by plea bargaining.  How might
the grand jury serve the plea process?
The extent to which the grand jury is involved in current plea bargaining prac-
tice is dependent on the context of the guilty plea, and limited at best.  Even where
grand jury indictment is required for prosecution of a certain offense, many defendants
waive the right to grand jury indictment to facilitate or expedite a guilty plea.112  In
these cases, there is no grand jury review of the charges alleged against the defendant. 
Of course, many guilty pleas are entered after the grand jury has returned an indict-
ment.113  Therefore, in those cases, the defendant may ultimately plead guilty to alle-
gations that have been screened by a grand jury.114  However, a post-indictment plea
deal easily could require a defendant to plead guilty to a count or counts not included
in the original indictment.115
Although the allegations to which a defendant pleads guilty (at least) sometimes
have been screened for probable cause by a grand jury, the judge—and the judge
alone—determines the sufficiency of the defendant’s allocution and the factual basis
of the guilty plea necessary for entry of judgment of conviction.116  Furthermore, the
109 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 2463 (2004); Erica Hashimoto, Toward Ethical Plea Bargaining, 30 CARDOZO L.
REV. 949 (2008); Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L.
REV. 407 (2008); Wright, supra note 18.
110 See supra note 109.
111 See Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding, supra note 18; Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Outsourcing
Criminal Prosecution? The Limits of Criminal Justice Privatization, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
263, 293.
112 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(b). The author elsewhere has explored questions regarding the
historical and constitutional basis for waiver of grand jury indictment. See Fairfax, Grand Jury
Discretion, supra note 5, passim.
113 Obviously, this is dependent on whether the jurisdiction requires grand jury indictment
for the class of offense in question, or the prosecutor chose to obtain one. Where grand jury
indictment is not required for a charged crime, there may be no grand jury action at all in a
criminal case. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. V (requiring grand jury indictment only for
“capital, or otherwise infamous” federal criminal charges); FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(a) (calling for
a grand jury “when public interest so requires”).
114 Indeed, the fact of the grand jury indictment may have even played a role in the defen-
dant’s decision to plea bargain in the first place. See supra note 16; see also Fairfax, Grand
Jury Discretion, supra note 5, at 754.
115 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1).
116 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3) & 11(c)(3).
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grand jury plays no role whatsoever in approving or supervising the particulars of the
plea bargain itself.  Where the court has discretion to do so,117 she and she alone may
take into account issues such as fairness to the defendant or victim, or vindication of
community interests when deciding whether to approve a plea bargain.118
By these accounts, it would seem that the grand jury has little, if any, relevance
for the modern regime of plea bargaining.  But should it?  There is a fair argument that
the grand jury could have a role to play in providing community supervision of guilty
pleas.  Such community input could apply both to a review of the factual basis for the
plea and the propriety of the plea bargain itself—tasks currently allocated to the judicial
officer presiding over the plea colloquy.119
For example, some defendants plead guilty to crimes they did not commit for the
sake of expediency or out of a feeling of inevitability.120  For those for whom such a
practice is unacceptable, the grand jury’s hearing of a defendant’s allocution may help
to prevent the phenomenon from occurring.121  Other defendants enter into plea agree-
ments with terms a judge approves but the community would find repugnant.  In these
situations, a grand jury could push back, or at least be offered a rationale from the
prosecutor and/or the defendant as to why the particular plea bargain serves the ends
of justice.122
The idea of utilizing the grand jury in this way is not a conceptual outlier. 
Professor Laura Appleman has proposed a “plea jury,” which would oversee the
plea process.123  Although Professor Appleman’s proposed “plea jury” specifically
borrows from the grand jury certain functional elements, such as the duration of
service,124 and method of selection,125 the key innovation is the introduction of the
117 See, e.g., id.
118 See O’Hear, supra note 109, at 459–60; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3).
119 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c).
120 See Bowers, supra note 16, at 1132–34; see also Stephanos Bibas, Response,
Exacerbating Injustice, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 53 (2008), http://www.pennumbra
.com/responses/11-2008/Bibas.pdf (agreeing with the proposition that guilty pleas by innocent
defendants are misguided and erode public confidence in the criminal justice system).
121 Of course, this begs the question whether judges are just as qualified to filter out false
pleas. Perhaps, but a group of laypersons with their collective wisdom, life experiences, and
common sense, would seem to add some value to the filtering process.
122 One of the more notable examples of what some characterize as a “runaway” grand
jury can be found in the Rocky Flats grand jury, which was appalled by a plea bargain the
government entered into with a company accused of malfeasance in connection with a nuclear
waste accident. Judith M. Beall, Note, What Do You Do with a Runaway Grand Jury?: A
Discussion of the Problems and Possibilities Opened Up By The Rocky Flats Grand Jury
Investigation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 617 (1998).
123 Laura I. Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 IND. L.J. 731, 748 (2010) (describing the plea
jury “as a cross between a grand jury and a petit jury”).
124 Id. (“Like a grand jury, [the plea jury] would serve more than once, for at least a month
at a time.”).
125 Id. (“Like a grand jury, [the plea jury] would be comprised of people randomly selected
from the community, with no peremptory or for-cause challenges to shape its ranks.”).
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community—through a jury-like body—into the guilty plea process, an idea rarely
discussed in the literature.126  However, the author would offer a friendly amendment
to the Appleman proposal.  The empowerment of the community in the guilty plea
process does not require the creation of a new body.  The grand jury could do this
work, offering its heritage and credibility to offset some of the potential problems
and deficiencies related to Professor Appleman’s “plea jury” proposal.127
Furthermore, there is nothing in the Constitution that would serve as an obstacle
to the adaptation of the grand jury to the purpose of reviewing guilty pleas and plea
agreements.  Any restrictions on the grand jury performing such a function (such as
the waiver rule)128 are statutory in nature and, therefore, easily can be altered.  Perhaps
one might argue that the common law heritage of the grand jury does not support its
use in this way.  However, much of the grand jury’s heritage antedates the modern
practice of plea bargaining.129  The fact that we have not utilized the grand jury in the
plea process in the past is a poor excuse to stifle such grand jury innovation today. 
Once again, we have an opportunity to adapt the grand jury to the needs of modern
criminal justice.
2. Grand Jury as Tool for Increased Popular Input into Criminal Sentencing
There has been increased scholarly exploration of the merits of jury sentencing,130
a largely historical practice that has seen renewed interest in the past decade.131 
126 Professor Appleman points out that very few scholars have explored the idea of using
a jury in this way, and none in any depth. Id. at 741 & n.53 (citing Stephanos Bibas & Richard
A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85,
141, 144 (2004); Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 801, 874–78 (2003)).
127 See id. at 768–76 (discussing potential criticism of a “plea jury”). Professor Appleman
acknowledges that there are a number of potential limits to the efficacy of a plea jury, including
negative impacts on efficiency, the danger that untrained lay jurors will fail to reach reason-
able decision regarding proper plea bargains and will contribute to harsh sentencing practices
and sentencing disparities, harm to defendants, and difficulties with identifying and relying
upon a coherent sense of the “community” that the plea jurors are meant to represent. See id.
128 FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(b).
129 See supra notes 88–94 and accompanying text.
130 See, e.g., Donald Braman, Criminal Law and the Pursuit of Equality, 84 TEX. L. REV.
2097, 2125–31 (2006); Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951
(2003); Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REV. 311
(2003); Chris Kemmitt, Function Over Form: Reviving the Criminal Jury’s Historical Role
as a Sentencing Body, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 93 (2006); Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L.
Noble, Felony Jury Sentencing in Practice: A Three-State Study, 57 VAND. L. REV. 885
(2004); Erik Lillquist, The Puzzling Return of Jury Sentencing: Misgivings About Apprendi,
82 N.C. L. REV. 621 (2004). For a discussion of the development of jury sentencing in the
capital sentencing context, see Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two
Tracks of Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV.
1145, 1151–55 (2009).
131 For a fascinating historical study of the early development of jury sentencing in a number
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Although proposals in favor of jury sentencing vary in their rationales,132 some, like
Adriaan Lanni, emphasize the injection of community wisdom into the sentencing
process.133  Professor Lanni deftly outlines the ways in which use of jury sentencing
can help “implement[ ] community justice” while “avoid[ing] many of the pitfalls
of current community justice programs.”134  To the extent that popular input is the pri-
mary reason some have called for the petit jury to take an expanded role in sentenc-
ing,135 why not use the grand jury to supply popular input on sentences handed down
to convicted defendants?136
The grand jury is equal, if not superior, to the petit jury in terms of the characteris-
tics that serve the community input function.137  Although the petit jury determining
guilt will be familiar with the evidence presented at trial, perhaps this is reason to
avoid utilizing it to influence sentencing.138  The grand jury could be more easily
walled off from information not relevant (or prejudicial) to the sentencing decision. 
Also, sentencing arguments could be presented to grand juries that had no involve-
ment with the cases at all.139  Furthermore, as is discussed above, very few criminal
cases go to trial, so the petit jury’s potential role in sentencing is drastically circum-
scribed.140  On the other hand, the grand jury is involved in many cases that ultimately
end in a guilty plea.141  To the extent that there is a preference for having a jury pre-
viously exposed to the facts of the case, the grand jury is well positioned to play that
role even in cases disposed of by guilty plea.
of states, see Nancy J. King, The Origins of Felony Jury Sentencing in the United States, 78
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 937 (2003).
132 See Adriaan Lanni, The Future of Community Justice, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 359,
401 (2005) (“[S]cholars have supported jury sentencing through arguments based on deliber-
ative democratic theory, constitutional law, and public policy.” (internal citations omitted)).
133 See, e.g., id. at 364 (“[L]ocalized decision-making has the virtue of permitting individual
communities to strike their own balance between security and the social costs of harsh law
enforcement policies.”); see also Adriaan Lanni, Note, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases:
An Idea Whose Time Has Come (Again)?, 108 YALE L.J. 1775, 1775 (1999) (arguing jury
sentencing would better “reflect the ‘conscience of the community’”).
134 Lanni, supra note 132, at 401.
135 See generally id.
136 I thank Professor Rachel Barkow for this suggestion.
137 See Fairfax, Grand Jury Discretion, supra note 5, at 745.
138 Cf. Lillquist, supra note 130, passim.
139 Of course, sentencing arguments could be presented to petit juries, but this would clash
with the structural characteristics (single case, duration or service, etc.) of these juries, such
that they would come to resemble grand juries.
140 However, Professor Michael Cahill has argued that petit juries should be given greater
information regarding the punishment exposure determined by the offenses on which they
determine guilt at the conviction stage. Michael T. Cahill, Punishment Decisions at Conviction:
Recognizing the Jury as Fault-Finder, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 91.
141 See supra notes 113–16 and accompanying text.
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B. Diversion and ADR
1. Deferred Prosecution Agreements
Recently, much attention has been focused on the role of deferred prosecution
agreements in the war on white-collar crime.142  These agreements permit defendants
(usually corporations) to avoid or delay prosecution (or even formal charging) in ex-
change for concessions to the government.143  The number of deferred prosecution
agreements between the government and would-be defendants has increased dramati-
cally in recent years.144  Deferred prosecution agreements remain a popular prosecuto-
rial tool in large part because they can prompt tangible changes in corporate behavior.145 
However, there are a number of accountability concerns with these agreements, height-
ened by the lack of judicial oversight.146  In one notable example, the deferred prosecu-
tion agreement provided for the target company to fund an endowed chair in business
ethics at the alma mater of the United States Attorney.147  In fact, Congress recently
has taken an interest in regulating deferred prosecution agreements.148
For those who harbor concerns regarding accountability and transparency with
the deferred prosecution agreement regime, the grand jury may be well-positioned
to supply the desired oversight.  Although negotiation of such agreements may prop-
erly be considered an aspect of prosecutorial discretion, the grand jury, by injecting
the community’s viewpoint, can help the prosecutor to balance important competing
considerations.
142 See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, Corporate Criminal Liability and the Potential for
Rehabilitation, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1417, 1431–34 (2009) (discussing deferred prosecution
agreements as a tool for corporate rehabilitation); Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating
the ‘New Regulators’: Current Trends in Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 159 (2008) (discussing the increase in deferred prosecution agreements as a result of
change in Department of Justice policy).
143 See Henning, supra note 142, at 1420; Spivack & Raman, supra note 142, at 160.
144 See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, Corporate Pretrial Pacts by DOJ Rose Sharply in 2007, NAT’L
L.J., Jan. 21, 2008, at 7.
145 See Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 894–902
(2007).
146 But see, e.g., Christopher M. Matthews, Judge Blasts Compliance Monitors at Innospec
Plea Hearing, MAIN JUSTICE (March 18, 2010, 7:45 PM), http://wordpress.tsgdomain.com/
MainJusticeDemo/2010/03/18/judge-blasts-compliance-monitors-at-innospec-plea-hearing/.
147 Dick Thornburgh, The Dangers of Over-Criminalization and the Need for Real Reform:
The Dilemma of Artificial Entities and Artificial Crimes, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1279, 1284
(2007) (referring to the provision of the deferred prosecution agreement as “reek[ing] of good
old fashioned pork-barrel politics”). In fairness, the endowed chair was meant to promote ethics
and good corporate governance, which is a positive result. However, perhaps the perception
would have been aided had a grand jury approved the deferred prosecution arrangement.
148 See, e.g., Carrie Johnson, Mukasey Had Been Overseer Finalist, WASH. POST, Jan. 30,
2008, at D1.
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Of course, as it stands now, many of these deferred prosecution agreements are
struck in the shadow of the grand jury.149  Some of these agreements are reached right
at the point before the prosecutor will ask the grand jury to return an indictment.150  In
those cases, there may have been a thorough grand jury investigation, utilizing the re-
sources and subpoena power of the grand jury.  Some of these deferred prosecution
agreements will be struck after an indictment has been returned.151  Although a grand
jury indictment is not considered a formal charging document until the prosecutor signs
it,152 the returned indictment is the grand jury’s expression of probable cause that the
target entity is guilty of criminal wrongdoing.153
Also, it should be acknowledged that deferred prosecution agreements and non-
prosecution agreements are ubiquitous in the “blue-collar” criminal area as well.  Prose-
cutors will, as a matter of course, extract some sort of restitution, promise, or change
in behavior in exchange for a deferral or dismissal of criminal charges.154  Such arrange-
ments are sometimes pursuant to formal statutory programs,155 but just as often are done
informally.156  The uneven exercise of discretion to forbear prosecution and recom-
mend diversion to similarly-situated defendants is one of the chief areas of concern for
those critical of broad prosecutorial discretion.157  The grand jury can help to inform
prosecutorial and judicial discretion as to which defendants are appropriate candidates
for such diversion programs.
149 See Spivack & Raman, supra note 142, at 160.
150 See, e.g., id. at 167 n.42.
151 As previously noted, an individual criminal defendant may plead guilty after an indict-
ment. See supra notes 113–16 and accompanying text. For an example of a corporation that
entered into a deferred prosecution agreement after indictment, see James B. Jacobs & Ronald
Goldstock, Monitors & IPSIGS: Emergence of a New Criminal Justice Role, 43 CRIM. L.
BULL. 217, 233-34 & nn.52–53, and accompanying text (recounting the New York Racing
Association’s entering into a deferred prosecution agreement premised on accepting all the
conduct alleged in its indictment).
152 FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1).
153 E.g., United States v. Saussy, 802 F.2d 849, 852 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S.
907 (1987).
154 See Benjamin M. Greenblum, Note, What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred? Judicial
Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1863, 1866–71
(2005) (discussing the use of deferred prosecution agreements in criminal law prior to their
application in the corporate context).
155 See 18 U.S.C. § 3154 (2006); BARRY MAHONEY ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE,
PRETRIAL SERVICES PROGRAMS: RESPONSIBILITIES AND POTENTIAL 53 (2001), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181939.pdf (“Pretrial diversion programs provide an option
of deferred prosecution for certain categories of defendants . . . .”).
156 See Charles W. Thomas & W. Anthony Fitch, Prosecutorial Decision Making, 13 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 507, 530 (1976) (“Pretrial diversion is a relatively new name for a traditional
manifestation of prosecutorial discretion.”).
157 Michael Edmund O’Neill, When Prosecutors Don’t: Trends in Federal Prosecutorial
Declinations, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221, 224 (2003) (citing Darryl K. Brown, Third-Party
Interests in Criminal Law, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1383, 1399–1401 (2002)).
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2. Drug Courts and Problem-Solving Courts
Drug courts are an outgrowth of the larger “problem-solving courts” movement in
criminal justice over the past twenty years.158  These problem solving courts address a
wide variety of social ills giving rise to criminal conduct.159  Drug courts generally offer
a drug-addicted offender an attractive pre- or post-guilty plea diversion alternative.160 
In exchange for successfully completing a drug treatment and rehabilitation regimen
under a court’s close supervision, the offender has her charges dismissed or signifi-
cantly reduced.161  Sanctions are imposed by the court for missteps along the way, and
ultimate failure to complete the program is often punished with incarceration.162
The grand jury conceivably has a role to play in facilitating courts’ implementation
of the core principles advanced by drug courts.  To the extent that resource constraints
limit the number of drug-addicted offenders who might be able to take advantage
of drug courts, the grand jury could be in a position to recommend which defendants
should be extended the opportunity.  Also, because defendants who successfully
complete the program often escape traditional punishment for crimes they may have
committed,163 the grand jury can extend the community’s imprimatur on the court’s
decision to permit such diversion.
Even within the drug court’s operation, the grand jury may be in a position to add
value.  For example, Eric Miller proposes a “drug grand jury”164 which would “replace
the drug court judge, and thus the hierarchical relation between judge on the one hand,
and community and offender on the other, with a grand jury made up of randomly
selected members of the community.”165  Armed with training from drug treatment
158 See, e.g., Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment Court
Movement, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1205, 1206 (1998); Michael C. Dorf & Jeffrey A. Fagan,
Problem-Solving Courts: From Innovation to Institutionalization, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1501, 1502 (2003); Eric J. Miller, Drugs, Courts, and the New Penology, 20 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 417, 420–24 (2009); Michael M. O’Hear, Rethinking Drug Courts: Restorative
Justice as a Response to Racial Injustice, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 463, 463–65 (2009).
159 Dorf & Fagan, supra note 158, at 1507 (citing specialized courts directed at “mentally
ill offenders, drunk drivers, parole or probation violators, gun carriers, [and] domestic violence
offenders”); see also Tamar M. Meekins, “Specialized Justice”: The Over-Emergence of
Specialty Courts and the Threat of a New Criminal Defense Paradigm, 40 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 1, 2–3 (2006).
160 See, e.g., Josh Bowers, Contraindicated Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L. REV. 783, 784 (2008).
161 Drug courts have faced increasing criticism from some commentators who see them
as ineffective and potentially harmful to more vulnerable defendants in drug cases. See, e.g.,
id. at 786–90; Eric J. Miller, Embracing Addiction: Drug Courts and the False Promise of
Judicial Interventionism, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1479 (2004). Nevertheless, many jurisdictions
around the country trumpet the success of their drug court programs. See, e.g., Aruna Jain,
For Drug Offenders, A Second Chance, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2006, at T3.
162 See Bowers, supra note 160, at 784–85.
163 See id. at 784.
164 Miller, supra note 158, at 450.
165 Id. at 450–51.
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professionals, and representatives of the court, prosecutors’ offices, and defenders’
offices,166 the proposed drug grand jury would recommend treatment programs for
drug-addicted offenders and supervise offender compliance.167  Upon an offender’s suc-
cessful completion of these programs, the drug grand jury would decline indictment.168 
Professor Miller’s proposal specifically seeks to leverage the unique features of the
grand jury, including its cross-sectional representation169 and its norm of secrecy.170
3. Criminal Alternative Dispute Resolution: Victim-Offender Mediation
The study and use of alternative dispute resolution in the criminal process has
grown dramatically over the last several decades.171  Sentencing circles, peacemaking
circles, restorative justice, and victim-offender mediation, are all examples of the appli-
cation of ADR to criminal justice.172  Certainly, the grand jury’s aforementioned attri-
butes and grounding in the community position it well to serve as a tool of community
justice, one of the complementary aims of the use of alternative dispute resolution
in criminal cases.173
One specific utilization might be found in victim-offender mediation.  Victim-
offender mediation is a process by which offenders and victims voluntarily meet
face-to-face with the assistance of a neutral mediator.174  The mediator helps each
party identify their key interests and facilitates a recognition of how those interests
prompted, or were impacted by, the incident which led to the criminal conduct.175 
A successful mediation results in an agreement resolving the issues and conflict
166 Id. at 455.
167 Id. at 452–53.
168 See id.
169 See id. at 458. However, Professor Miller seeks to enhance the representativeness of
the the drug grand jury (particularly in disadvantaged communities) by removing traditional
filters from the juror selection process. See id. (“[M]y position is that grand jurors should not
be excluded for [past] criminal activity unless such activity intimidates the equal participation
of the other members of the grand jury.”).
170 See id. at 460.
171 See, e.g., Carol Izumi, The Use of ADR in Criminal and Juvenile Delinquency Cases,
in AM. BAR ASS’N, ADR HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES 195 (Donna Stienstra & Susan M. Yates
eds., 2004) (examining the use of ADR with adult and juvenile offenders); Maggie T. Grace,
Criminal Alternative Dispute Resolution: Restoring Justice, Respecting Responsibility, and
Renewing Public Norms, 34 VT. L. REV. 563 (2010); Uday Shankar & Vinayak Mishra,
Exploring Viability of Introducing ADR in Criminal Law, 7 ICFAI U. J. ALT. DISP. RES. 37
(2008).
172 See, e.g., Izumi, supra note 171, at 195–203; Shankar & Mishra, supra note 171, at 41–45.
173 Professor Adriaan Lanni has proposed that the grand jury could serve the community
justice movement, which she feels is ill-served by other traditional criminal justice mechanisms.
See Lanni, supra note 132, at 360–64.
174 Izumi, supra note 171, at 196.
175 Id.
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underlying the criminal conduct,176 and a plan for prospective avoidance of repeat
incidents.177  If such an agreement is reached and complied with by the offender, the
charges typically are dismissed (or never brought in the first place).178  Victim-offender
mediation is often employed in misdemeanor and property offenses, but it also has
been used in serious assaultive felonies as well.179  Although victim-offender mediation
presents profound substantive and procedural questions about the role of restorative
justice in criminal law,180 it, where implemented, has proven to be very successful and
well-received by victims and offenders alike.181
However, a shortcoming of victim-offender mediation has been the relatively
low utilization rate despite the degree of success realized when the approach is em-
ployed.182  Typically, a prosecutor or police agency is responsible for referring cases
to community victim-offender mediation programs.183  Such referrals involve a tre-
mendous amount of discretion on the part of the prosecutor.184  The cases referred for
mediation are typically meritorious, in that there exists probable cause to believe a
crime has been committed and the facts are fairly clear.  Many prosecutors may be
reluctant to refer to a community mediation program for disposition those cases in
which they likely could easily win conviction.  This is particularly so given that victim-
offender mediation is viewed as non-traditional and unfamiliar in most circles.185  The
grand jury can help prosecutors make the early-stage decisions regarding which cases
are appropriate for mediation.  This would both increase the utilization of the practice
and add the community’s imprimatur upon these referrals of cases outside the tradi-
tional criminal process.
176 See, e.g., Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Use of Mediation to Resolve Criminal Cases:
A Procedural Critique, 43 EMORY L.J. 1247, 1265 (1994).
177 See Linda G. Mills, The Justice of Recovery: How the State Can Heal the Violence of
Crime, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 457, 504 (2006) (explaining that victim-offender mediation “engages
[participants] in creating a plan, or ‘social compact,’ for addressing that behavior and the
underlying problems that can initiate it”).
178 See Brown, supra note 176, at 1248–49.
179 See id. at 1262.
180 See id. at 1291–1301.
181 See Izumi, supra note 171, at 196–97.
182 Mark William Bakker, Repairing the Breach and Reconciling the Discordant: Mediation
in the Criminal Justice System, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1479, 1507 & n.207 (1994).
183 See Brown, supra note 176, at 1265.
184 See Jody Lyneé Madeira, When It’s So Hard to Relate: Can Legal Systems Mitigate
the Trauma of Victim-Offender Relationships?, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 401, 462–63 (2009) (noting
that in the vast majority of states, victim-offender mediation is left to the discretion of the
authorities).
185 See Gordon Bazemore, The “Community” in Community Justice: Issues, Themes, and
Questions for the New Neighborhood Sanctioning Models, 19 JUST. SYS. J. 193, 195 (1997)
(“[Victim-offender mediation]s are still unfamiliar to some mainstream criminal justice
audiences and marginal to the court process in many jurisdictions where they do operate.”).
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Another criticism of victim-offender mediation is the fact that agreements reached
between victims and offenders following mediation are subject to very little court
supervision.186  These agreements will often include not only a formal apology and
promise to cease and desist certain behavior, but also might include restitution de-
signed to make the victim whole, a release of liability claims, and promises to seek
counseling or treatment.187  Although in the broad run of matters, there will be nothing
objectionable contained in the agreements, there may be a perceived need for review
aside from that provided by the prosecutor’s office, particularly because victim-offender
mediation programs often discourage the presence and participation of attorneys for
either party.188  The grand jury could serve as that additional set of eyes, ensuring that
agreements reached between victim and offender are compatible with the community’s
sense of fairness and justice, and that neither the victim nor the offender is taken
advantage of in the process.
C. Guiding and Regulating Prosecutors
1. Guiding Prosecutorial Priorities
Many have struggled with how to enhance accountability among prosecutors.189 
One frequent suggestion is the development of prosecutorial guidelines to help channel
the discretion of prosecutors in individual cases and with regard to broader prosecu-
torial priorities.190  Although the grand jury has the ability to—and, in the opinion of
the author, was designed to—guide the discretion of the prosecutor in these ways in
the context of its traditionally understood function,191 it often falls short of this goal.192 
While a number of proposals aimed at enhancing the grand jury’s traditional functions
seek to empower the grand jury to better guide prosecutorial discretion in individual
186 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 176, at 1271.
187 See, e.g., Izumi, supra note 171, at 196.
188 See Zvi D. Gabbay, Holding Restorative Justice Accountable, 8 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 85, 107 (2006).
189 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability,
157 U. PA. L. REV. 959 (2009) (asserting that efforts to increase prosecutorial accountability
through legislation and ex post review cannot adequately address the issue and arguing that
empowering various stakeholders and reforming the internal structure, culture, and incentives
of prosecutors’ offices is a better approach).
190 See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, The Decision to File Federal Criminal Charges: A
Quantitative Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 246, 291 (1980) (“There
are a number of procedural devices that have been suggested as means for controlling prose-
cutorial discretion, including . . . promulgation of written rules or guidelines for the exercise
of discretion . . . .”).
191 See Fairfax, Grand Jury Discretion, supra note 5, at 705–06.
192 See id. at 761–62.
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cases,193 not much has been proposed to help the grand jury give feedback to prose-
cutors on community preferences regarding broad prosecutorial priorities.194
But what if the grand jury were used as a sort of focus group to give prosecutors
feedback from the community on enforcement priorities?  The author has noted else-
where that the feedback the grand jury can give prosecutors can help it serve as a
“sounding board” in individual cases.195  Rather than waiting until the petit jury stage
where a negative reaction to the merits or framing of the case could lead to an acquittal,
the prosecutor can receive early feedback from the grand jury.196  The grand jury, to
the extent it features a cross-section of the population,197 provides a rich collection of
voices and opinions on how prosecutors should allocate law enforcement resources.
193 See supra, Part I.B.
194 The author has suggested that the grand jury’s robust exercise of discretion could serve
such a purpose. See, e.g., Fairfax, Grand Jury Discretion, supra note 5, at 755–56. However,
as has been acknowledged, such a use of grand jury discretion can be accompanied by certain
noise (i.e., does the prosecutor get the message?) and efficiency costs that might be avoided
under the current proposal. See id. at 708, 712 n.31, 748.
195 See id. at 757.
196 Such grand jury feedback is superior to that from the petit jury (in the form of an
acquittal or hung jury) for a number of reasons. First, the prosecutor can ask questions of the
grand jurors and engage in a conversation in a way that cannot happen at the petit jury stage.
See supra note 21 and accompanying text. Therefore, the information flows in two directions,
rather than in the vague, unilateral manner represented by a jury verdict. Also, at the grand jury
stage, there is still time to address flaws in the case. A prosecutor can obtain additional evi-
dence, call or recall witnesses, or explain to the grand jurors why the prosecutor’s office exer-
cised its discretion to bring the case. See supra Part I.A.2. Finally, and most importantly, the
Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply to grand jury decisions not to indict. See Fairfax, Grand
Jury Discretion, supra note 5, at 743–44.
197 However, as Dean Kevin Washburn has noted, there are serious challenges to the grand
jury’s service of the cross-sectional ideal. See Washburn, supra note 16, at 2373–76. On the
federal level, for example, the grand jury typically is drawn from an entire judicial district. As
a result, even if the pool of eligible grand jurors reflects the geographic diversity of the district,
a particular grand jury may not. See id. at 2375–76. Obviously, no individual grand or petit
jury can be fully representative of the larger community, but this certainly limits the utility of
the grand jury as a true “focus group.” Another challenge is the fact that although community
input may be useful in a particular case, the particular grand jury considering it may not have
any grand jurors from the affected community. See id. at 2376. As a result, different commu-
nities within the same district may impose their own attitudes and views on other communities.
See id.
Thus, some scholars have argued that we should enhance the commonality of interests
of the community being represented by the grand jury. One such proposal has been advanced
by Adriaan Lanni, who has advocated a reduction in the size of the grand jury’s “catchment”
area. See, e.g., Lanni, supra note 132, at 394–95. Such a reduction, Professor Lanni argues,
would enable the grand jury to be a tool for furthering the aims of community justice. Id. In
this same vein, Kevin Washburn has proposed that grand juries be neighborhood-based. See,
e.g., Washburn, supra, at 2378–79. According to Dean Washburn, a grand jury based on tighter
jurisdictional boundaries will be more engaged and responsive. Id. at 2377.
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A grand jury might be empanelled, for instance, to give prosecutors advice on
whether to focus on certain quality-of-life crimes, or how best to tackle the drug trade
in certain communities.  The secrecy of the grand jury would protect grand jurors from
outside pressure or intimidation, and would give them the liberty to express opinion
without outside scrutiny.  The mandate of grand jury service would compel the citi-
zens to show up and participate.
One objection might be that voters already play this role at each election.  After
all, most of the chief prosecutors in the United States are directly elected and those who
are not (such as in the federal system) serve at the pleasure of an official who is.198  A
number of recent studies have shown that electoral politics do not provide a sufficient
vehicle for prosecutorial accountability, however.199  The grand jury could provide the
sort of focused, considered popular judgment that may be lacking in general elections.
Another potential objection is that, given the prosecution’s traditional monopoly
over information made available to the grand jury, the grand jury would simply tell
the prosecutor what she wants to hear.200  First, although modern grand jury practice
obscures the fact, the grand jury possesses the power to compel production of almost
anything, from almost anyone.201  Certainly, information the grand jury might want
could be obtained quite easily in the form of oral or written testimony from experts or
others with knowledge.202  Although grand jurors could be informed of this power,
some may remain skeptical that grand juries would actually exercise it, particularly
if a prosecutor is present.  For those concerned about the impact of the presence of
prosecutors on balanced consideration by the grand jury, there is no reason a prose-
cutor has to be present.  For those who lack confidence that grand jurors will seek
information on their own, perhaps some sort of neutral grand jury legal adviser—a
Although there are legitimate questions regarding whether the grand jury represents a
cross-section of the community (and the difficulty of defining “community”), they should not
fully diminish the role the grand jury could play in modern criminal justice.
198 See Fairfax, Delegation, supra note 26, at 443 (citing ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY
JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 10–11 (2007)).
199 See Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat
of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 439–43 (2001); Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections
Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581, 583 (2009).
200 See, e.g., Fairfax, Grand Jury Discretion, supra note 5, at 705 (“[T]he familiar per-
ception of the modern grand jury [is that of] a body that, after passively receiving from the
prosecutor just enough evidence . . . to satisfy the probable cause threshold, reflexively and
without critical analysis votes to indict, just as the prosecutor requested.” (citations omitted)).
201 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972) (“It is a grand inquest, a body with
powers of investigation and inquisition, the scope of whose inquiries is not to be limited
narrowly . . . .” (quoting Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919)); see also Fairfax,
Grand Jury Discretion, supra note 5, at 746–47 (“[T]he grand jury can use its tremendous
subpoena power to seek any information it desires—whether or not the prosecutor concurs.”).
202 Such testimony could be either invited or subpoenaed. See Fairfax, Grand Jury Discretion,
supra note 5, at 747.
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proposal made for the enhancement of the grand jury’s traditional functions203—would
address their concerns.
2. Regulating Prosecutorial Conduct
Another proposal central to efforts to enhance prosecutorial accountability is the
establishment of prosecutorial review boards.204  These review boards seek to impose
external oversight of prosecutorial decision-making, as a means to keep prosecutors
accountable.205  Although some who propose such external review boards would prefer
that they be composed of attorney experts drawn from the criminal justice system,206
others believe such external review boards also would be well-served by the partici-
pation of non-attorney citizens.207  For those in the latter camp, the grand jury can be
an appropriate vehicle for having the community serve as a check on prosecutorial
decision-making.
The grand jury could be the ideal vehicle for such oversight.  Pretermitting the
oversight the grand jury might exercise in individual cases,208 grand juries could func-
tion as the prosecutor review boards proposed by many commentators.  In fact, under
current practice, allegations of police and other official misconduct often are inves-
tigated by the grand jury in many jurisdictions.209  Also, some grand juries, such as
“special grand juries” in the federal system, are structured to issue reports of findings.210 
Furthermore, even those who propose an expert (rather than a citizen) review board
recognize the need for the kind of subpoena power the grand jury already wields.211
Also, some have advocated a public reporting requirement for prosecutorial deci-
sions made, including declinations.212  To the extent that such a requirement would
raise concerns over privacy of would-be defendants and the revealing of sensitive law
enforcement strategy, such reporting can be directed to the grand jury.  In this way,
203 See, e.g., Hoffmeister, supra note 98.
204 See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 198, at 184–86.
205 Id. at 184–85.
206 See, e.g., JOHN F. TERZANO ET AL., THE JUSTICE PROJECT, IMPROVING PROSECUTORIAL
ACCOUNTABILITY: A POLICY REVIEW 14 (2009) (“The review board should be comprised of
individuals within the criminal justice system who present a broad range of interests and an
understanding of the unique responsibilities of prosecutors, including judges, prosecutors, and
criminal defense attorneys.”), available at http://www.thejusticeproject.org/wp-content/uploads/
pr-improving-prosecutorial-accountability1.pdf; Stephanos Bibas, Rewarding Prosecutors
for Performance, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 441, 444–45 (2009).
207 See, e.g., Davis, supra note 199, at 462–64; Fairfax, Delegation, supra note 26, at 453.
208 See Fairfax, Grand Jury Discretion, supra note 5.
209 See, e.g., Leonard Post, A Bill Offers a Peek Inside Grand Juries, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 1,
2003, at 4.
210 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3331–34 (2006) (federal special grand juries).
211 See TERZANO ET AL., supra note 206, at 14.
212 See, e.g., Fairfax, Delegation, supra note 26, at 453 & n.146.
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there would be community review of prosecutorial activity while the sensitive informa-
tion would be protected by grand jury secrecy.  Again, given its attributes and powers,
the grand jury is already situated to perform the roles contemplated for the regulation
and review of prosecutorial conduct.
CONCLUSION
Once we relinquish our cramped conception of the grand jury’s functional value,
there is no limit to how we might use it.  Indeed, there is no reason the utility of the
grand jury must be confined to the criminal justice realm.  In fact, “Grand Jury 3.0”
could be an instrument for the enhancement of democratic deliberation and discourse
outside of the criminal justice system.  The grand jury, as a cross-section of the com-
munity,213 represents a potentially vital and energetic vehicle for feedback from the
citizenry on a wide variety of issues.  Under this more robust view of its functional
value, the grand jury, for example, could give legislators and government officials com-
munity input on contemplated measures and policies, increase transparency surround-
ing large public expenditures, or serve in a designated watchdog role, guarding against
waste, fraud, and abuse.214
The foregoing is meant to change the tone and trajectory of conventional grand
jury reform discourse, which is far too narrow.  Although the improvement of the grand
jury’s performance of its traditional functions remains important, we must begin to
expand our conception of the grand jury’s functional value.  The grand jury’s heritage,
structure, and representative capacity render it a tremendous, though untapped and
underappreciated, resource.  Rather than focusing on the grand jury’s shortcomings
related to its traditional functions, this Article has sought to catalyze discussion of
how we can employ the ancient bulwark of liberty as a vehicle for serving the needs
of modern criminal justice.
213 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
214 See, e.g., Ronald F. Wright, Why Not Administrative Grand Juries?, 44 ADMIN. L.
REV. 465, 520–21 (1992).
